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IN THE SUPREME COURT <)l I IT All 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
ANTHONY A. SADDLER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20030439-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Supreme I mini linn piihihi linn pui'iiiiiil In I liLilli l iinlli 'uui 'H "• ] il % I < /! 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness and the correctness of that decision "turns on whether that 
mill .iiittiiraln'l " int fu i" '< mi! lllliiK ill! iiiiiiill < o u i l ' " " \k IMI IIII inula I hi,1 ii| pr npniiil iduiiliii I of 
review.". State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1f 9, 22 P.3d 1242. 
In reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, the appellate court 
cause existed/ "State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 14,48 P.3d 872 (quoting State v. Thurman, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 
1989)). The Court "afford[s] the magistrate's decision great deference and considers] the 
affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a common sense fashion. Id. 
(quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260 (quoting Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend, IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Following the execution of a search warrant, defendant was charged with unlawful 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8( 1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000), and unlawful possession of cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), both third degree felonies. R. 1-3. Defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. R. 35-
57. The trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 127:12-13. Defendant thereafter entered a 
conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and the cocaine 
charge was dismissed. R. 79-84. In pleading guilty, defendant reserved the right to appeal 
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 81. The trial court sentenced defendant 
2 
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to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years, but stayed execution thereof and placed 
defendant on supervised probation for 24 months. R. 107. 
The court of appeals reversed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress. State 
v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 27,67 P.3d 1025. Judge Judith Billings dissented. Id. at 
I^t 30-45. This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On June 15, 2000, Detective Bill McCarthy of the West Valley City Police 
Department obtained a warrant to search defendant's home for marijuana, cocaine, and items 
related to the distribution of drugs. R. 76-78; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 2. In a search 
of defendant's house later that day, police seized one gram of cocaine, 277 grams of 
marijuana, drug packaging material, triple beam scales, and $478.00 in cash. R. 35-57,60-
69; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 6. 
Search Warrant Affidavit 
In issuing the search warrant, the magistrate relied on Detective McCarthy' s Affidavit 
in Support of Search Warrant R. 70-74; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ffif 2-5. 
Information from Confidential Informant 
The affidavit was based in large part on information received "from a confidential 
informant" (CI). R. 72. Detective McCarthy "ask[ed]" that the magistrate "not [ ] require 
[him] to publish the CFs name" because McCarthy "believe[d] that the CI may be harmed if 
3 
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[her] name were published." R. 72.l The CI told Detective McCarthy that defendant had 
admitted to her that he "sells marijuana and cocaine." R. 72. She also said that she had 
observed in defendant's home (1) three scales "used to weigh out repackaged marijuana for 
resale"; (2) cocaine and packaging material; (3) the sale of controlled substances by 
defendant; and (4) three to four pounds of marijuana in the last week to ten days. R. 72. In 
addition, the CI told Detective McCarthy that she had observed defendant use cocaine in the 
home and carry cocaine and marijuana on his person. R. 72. 
Although the CI did not describe the precise nature of her relationship with defendant, 
she told Detective McCarthy that she has known him for over one year, that she has been to 
his home "numerous times," that she has observed him use cocaine and marijuana on 
numerous occasions in the past year, and that she herself used marijuana with him on several 
of those occasions. R. 72. As further evidence of her familiarity with defendant, the CI 
advised Detective McCarthy of defendant's "hours of operation," that defendant was home 
"infrequently and usually during the late evening hours," that his "only legitimate source of 
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City restaurant," and that he "sells 
controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income." 
R. 73. The CI also advised Detective McCarthy that defendant had told her he recently 
purchased the house, R. 73. 
1
 The CI's gender cannot be determined from the affidavit. The State, however, uses 
the feminine gender when referring to the CI to more easily distinguish between defendant 
and the CI. 
4 
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Independent Police Investigation 
To corroborate the CI's information, Detective McCarthy performed surveillance of 
defendant's home between 8:00 p.m. on June 14, 2000 and 6:00 a.m. on June 15,2000. R. 
73. Initially, Detective McCarthy observed no one at the residence. R. 73. However, after 
midnight, he "observed some short term traffic" at the residence that, based on his training, 
he believed was drug-related. See R. 73-74. At Detective McCarthy's direction, a patrol 
officer performed a traffic stop of one of the short term visitors to defendant's home and 
arrested him on outstanding warrants. R. 73. In a search incident to arrest, police discovered 
approximately one-half ounce of marijuana on the driver's person and a plastic twist of 
cocaine residue in the car. R. 73. However, no paraphernalia used to ingest marijuana or 
cocaine was found in either the car or on the driver's person. R. 73. 
Confidential Informant's Credibility 
In his affidavit, Detective McCarthy identified numerous factors that supported a 
belief that the CI's information was accurate and truthful, including: (l)the CI's 
observations were first-hand; (2) the CI would recognize the substance observed because she 
had used it; (3) the CI provided the information "out of a sense of guilt and desire to stop the 
sales and usage of controlled substances into [sic] the community"; (4) the CI had "not been 
promised nor paid for any of the information provided"; (5) Detective McCarthy observed a 
vehicle registered to a female companion of defendant, which vehicle the CI indicated 
defendant frequently used; (6) the CI indicated that defendant worked only part-time, and 
when officers checked at his place of employment, defendant was not at work and no one 
5 
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there knew when he was scheduled to return to work; (7) the CI's observations were over a 
long period of time and she stated "that the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been 
long term"; (8) short-term traffic consistent with drug activity was observed at defendant's 
home in the early morning hours of June 15,2000; and (9) one of the short-term visitors was 
stopped and found with marijuana and packaging material with cocaine residue but with no 
drug paraphernalia, suggesting that the marijuana was purchased from defendant's home. R. 
73-74. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213,103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983), the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause 
to search defendant's house. The supporting affidavit revealed that the informant knew 
defendant for over a year, had been to defendant's house numerous times, and had seen 
defendant sell drugs from the house. The informant indicated that defendant's sale of drugs 
was ongoing and that defendant had admitted to him that he sells cocaine and marijuana. 
Moreover, the informant indicated that he had observed in defendant's home scales used to 
weigh repackaged marijuana for resale, cocaine and packaging material, and within the past 
week to ten days, three to four pounds of marijuana. The affidavit also revealed that police 
had corroborated much of the information provided by the informant. In addition to 
corroborating some of the innocent details, police observed short-term traffic consistent with 
drug sales at defendant's home in the hours after midnight. Moreover, a stop of one of the 
short-term visitors revealed approximately one-half ounce of marijuana. Where police found 
6 
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no corresponding paraphernalia, they reasonably concluded that the visitor had just 
purchased marijuana from the residence. Contrary to the court of appeals' decision, the 
foregoing facts and others provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause 
finding. 
The majority opinion is erroneous in several respects. Contrary to Gates, the majority 
opinion analyzes the search warrant affidavit in terms of separate and essentially independent 
sub-tests that are either satisfied or failed. The majority opinion improperly focuses on the 
category of informants rather than on the unique characteristics of a particular informant. 
The majority opinion also insists on more detail than is required under Gates. And finally, 
the majority opinion errs in refusing to recognize the informant's statement against penal 
interest as a factor bolstering reliability. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE 
A challenge to a search warrant is governed by the "totality of the circumstances" 
standard as articulated twenty years ago in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 
(1983). As observed by Judge Billings in her dissent, the majority pays only "lip service" to 
that standard. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 44 (Billings, J., dissenting). Indeed, the 
majority's approach in deciding whether or not certain factors have been "satisfied," in 
dissecting the affidavit line-by-line, and in focusing on the unknowns rather than what is 
known, see id. at fflf 12-13, directly contradicts the teaching of Gates, turning what should be 
a "practical, nontechnical conception" into an "excessively technical dissection" of the 
affidavit and a "rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip." 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31, 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2330 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted). 
In the words of the dissent, the majority opinion "undermines what should be our 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to search warrants." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, 
at % 44 (Billings, J., dissenting). If left undisturbed, the decision will set back search and 
seizure jurisprudence in this State twenty years. 
8 
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A. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES STANDARD 
ARTICULATED IN ILLINOIS V. GATES 
1. The Gates Standard Rejects Hypertechnical Dissection of Search 
Warrant Affidavits in Favor of Practical, Common Sense Review 
(a) The Underlying Facts in Gates 
In Illinois v. Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an 
anonymous handwritten letter that read as follows: 
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town 
who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and 
Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the 
condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife 
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with 
drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after 
she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there 
again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. 
At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with 
over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 
worth of drugs in their basement. 
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their 
entire living on pushers. 
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. 
They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house 
often. 
Lance & Susan Gates 
Greenway 
in Condominiums 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 225,103 S.Ct. at 2325. After receiving the letter, police corroborated the 
innocent details provided in the letter. They confirmed that Lance Gates resided in a 
condominium on Greenway in Bloomingdale. Id. at 225-26, 103 S.Ct. at 2325. They 
9 
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verified that an "L. Gates" had made reservations to fly from Chicago to West Palm Beach, 
Florida on May 5 and federal agents confirmed that Gates made the trip on that day. Id. t^ 
226,103 S.Ct. at 2325-26. After Gates disembarked in Florida, federal agents followed him 
to a motel room registered to Susan Gates. Id. at 226, 103 S.Ct. at 2326. The following 
morning, agents observed Gates and an unidentified woman leave the motel in a Mercury— 
bearing a license plate number registered to a Hornet station wagon owned by Gates—and 
travel northbound on an interstate frequently used by Chicago-bound travelers. Id. 
Based on the letter and the information verifying the Gates' travel plans, police 
secured a warrant to search the Gates' home and car. Id. When Lance and Susan Gates 
arrived home nearly 24 hours after their departure from Florida, police were waiting with 
warrant in hand. Id. Police found 350 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the car and 
marijuana, weapons, and other contraband in the house. Id. 
(b) The Aguilar-Spinelli Test Applied bv the Illinois Supreme Court 
Applying the two-pronged test developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 
S.Ct. 1509 (1964), mdSpinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969), the 
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 227-29 & n.3, 103 S.Ct. at 2326-27 & n.3. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli 
test, a search warrant affidavit based on an informant's tip must demonstrate (1) the basis of 
the informant's knowledge that the evidence is at the location to be searched ("basis of 
knowledge" prong), and (2) the basis for believing that the informant is credible or the 
information is true (the "veracity" or "reliability" prong). Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114,84 S.Ct. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1514; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16, 89 S.Ct. at 588-89. The Illinois Supreme Court 
concluded that the affidavit did not satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test because it did not indicate 
the basis of the informant's knowledge and corroborated only innocent details of the tip. Id. 
at 229-30, 103 S.Ct. at 2327-28. 
(c) The 'Totality of the Circumstances" Standard Established in Gates 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the search 
warrant was supported by probable cause. In doing so, it abandoned the overly "rigorous" 
and "excessively technical" test that had developed after its decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli 
in favor of a "totality of the circumstances approach." Id. at 230,234-38,103 S.Ct. at 2328, 
2330-32. Gates held that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,103 S.Ct. at 2332 (emphasis added). 
The Court explained that in dealing with probable cause, courts simply deal with 
probabilities—"'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Id. at 231, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 
(quoting Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1210 (1949)). 
The Court observed that "probable cause is a fluid concept... [that is] not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 232,103 S.Ct. at 2329. The Court 
agreed that an informant's reliability and the basis of the informant's knowledge are 
"relevant considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis," but rejected the 
11 
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"compartmentalization" of these factors "into two largely independent channels" of inquiry. 
Id. at 231 n.6,233,103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6,2329. The Court explained that "a deficiency in 
one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong 
showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability" Id. at 233,103 S.Ct. at 2329 
(emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court further observed that "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for.. . concluding]' that probable cause 
existed.'" Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S 257, 
271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736 (I960)); accord State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 
1993). In other words, "after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit 
should not take the form of de novo review." Id. at 236,103 S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotes 
and citations omitted); accord State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). Rather, a 
reviewing court should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's probable cause 
determination. A/.at236,103 S.Ct. at 2331; accord Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991. "Agrudging 
or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Id. at 236, 
103 S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Gates thus held that '"the 
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the 
preference to be accorded to warrants.'" Id. at 237 n.10,103 S.Ct. at 2331 n. 10 (quoting 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746 (1965). 
12 
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(d) Upholding the Warrant in Gates 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Supreme Court in Gates concluded 
that a substantial basis existed for the magistrate's probable cause finding. Id. at 246, 103 
S.Ct. at 2336. The Court noted "that, standing alone, the anonymous letter . . . would not 
provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe 
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home." Id. at 227, 103 S.Ct. at 2326. It 
held, however, that "[t]he corroboration of the letter's predictions that the Gates' car would 
be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would 
drive the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the 
informant's other assertions also were true." Id. at 244, 103 S.Ct. at 2335. The Court 
concluded that such corroboration "suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment called 
for in making a probable cause determination." Id. Continuing, the Court held that "[i]t is 
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corroboration through other sources 
of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing ;a 
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.'" Id. at 244-45, 103 S.Ct. at 2335. 
2. A Substantial Basis Existed for the Magistrate's Probable Cause 
Finding That Drugs Would Be Found in Defendant's Home 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test to this case, a substantial basis existed 
for the magistrate's probable cause finding that drugs and other evidence of illegal 
distribution would be found in defendant's home. 
The CI informed police how she obtained the information that drugs and other 
evidence of distribution were in defendant's home. She informed police that she had known 
. 1 3 '
 ; " ' " '
:
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defendant for over a year, had been to his home "numerous times," and had used drugs with 
him. R. 72. She indicated that defendant had admitted to her that he "sells marijuana and 
cocaine" and that she personally had observed him sell controlled substances from the home. 
R. 72. She stated that defendant's "illicit sales operation [was] ongoing and has been long 
term" and that she was aware that defendant sold drugs to afford his own drug usage and as a 
separate source of income. R. 72-73. She also informed police that she had observed in 
defendant's home cocaine, packaging material, and three scales "used to weigh out 
repackaged marijuana for resale." Finally, she said she had observed three to four pounds of 
marijuana in defendant's home within the last week to ten days. R. 72. 
Other facts, either provided by the CI or obtained by police, bolstered the reliability of 
the information. For example, the CI admitted to having used drugs with defendant. R. 72. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that such admissions against penal interest 
"carry their own indicia of credibility." United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 575, 583,91 
S.Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971). This particularly holds true where, as here, the CI was not 
promised or paid anything in exchange for the information and provided the information "out 
of a sense of guilt and desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances." R. 73; cf. 
Norrisy 2001 UT 104, at f 18 (holding that" 'reliability and veracity are generally assumed 
when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in exchange for the 
information'"). 
The CI also informed police of defendant's hours of operation, indicating that he "is 
home infrequently and usually during the late evening hours." R. 73. To corroborate the 
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CI's claim, police performed surveillance of defendant's home between 8:00 p.m. on June 
14,2000 and 6:00 a.m. on June 15,2000. R. 73. As predicted, police initially observed no 
one at the residence. R. 73. And as predicted, police observed "some short term traffic" 
after midnight which was consistent with drug sales. See R. 73. Moreover, police stopped 
one of the short-term visitors to the apartment, and after arresting the visitor on an 
outstanding warrant, found approximately one-half ounce of marijuana on his person. R. 73. 
However, no paraphernalia to inhale the marijuana was found on the driver's person or in his 
car, suggesting to the trained officer that the substance had been purchased at defendant's 
home. R. 73-74. 
Police also confirmed some of the innocent details provided by the CI. For example, 
the CI indicated that defendant worked part-time at a Salt Lake City restaurant. R. 73. 
Consistent with that claim, defendant was not at work when police checked with the 
restaurant on June 15,2000 "and it was unknown when he was scheduled to return." R. 74. 
Police also found at the home the vehicle which the CI informed police defendant used and 
confirmed that it was registered to defendant's female companion, as asserted by the CI. See 
R.73. 
The foregoing facts, when viewed together, provided more than a sufficient basis for 
the magistrate's probable cause finding. Consistent with the warrant requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment, the affidavit "informed [the magistrate] of some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the informant concluded that.. . narcotics were where [s]he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer 
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concluded that the informant... was 'credible' or [her] information 'reliable.'" Gates, 462 
U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original). No more was required. 
Indeed, the facts supporting a probable cause finding here were more compelling than 
those which supported the probable cause finding in Gates. Whereas the informant in Gates 
provided no information indicating the basis of his knowledge, the informant here indicated 
that she had known defendant for over a year, had been to his home numerous times, and had 
personally observed the evidence and heard defendant admit that he sold drugs. Whereas the 
informant in Gates was anonymous, the informant here was known to the officer. See infra, 
at 22-23. Like the police in Gates, police here corroborated innocent details. However, 
unlike the police in Gates, the police here also corroborated the allegations of criminal 
conduct, stopping a short-term visitor and finding on him approximately one-half ounce of 
marijuana, but no paraphernalia. 
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION CONFLICTS WITH THE MANDATES OF GATES 
The majority opinion misapplies Gates and is fraught with errors. In a nutshell, the 
majority applies a rigid, excessively technical test similar to the Aguilar-Spinelli test, insists 
on more detail than is required under Gates, and erroneously interprets the law on a variety 
of other issues. 
1. The Majority Opinion Compartmentalizes the Inquiry Rather Than 
Reviewing the Facts as a Whole 
While purporting to follow Gates, the majority "in reality applies the older and stricter 
Aguilar-Spinelli test." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at % 44 (Billings, J., dissenting). In 
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reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit, the majority engages in an analysis examining 
whether "portions" of the "totality of the circumstances" test have been "satisfied." Saddler, 
2003 UT App 82, at ^ ff 12-13. The majority concludes that "the basis of knowledge portion 
is satisfied" but that "the veracity and reliability portions are not satisfied" Id. at^ Hf 12-13 
(emphases added). The majority thus creates separate and essentially independent sub-tests 
within the "totality of the circumstances" inquiry that are either satisfied or failed: an 
informant's basis of knowledge, an informant's 'Veracity," and the report's "reliability." It 
then engages in a game of addition and subtraction of sorts, concluding that passing the 
"basis of knowledge" test does not overcome the failure to pass the "veracity" and 
"reliability" tests. See id. at f 27. This approach is contrary to Gates. 
Referring to its decision in Aguilar, the Supreme Court in Gates observed that it never 
intended to impose such a "rigid compartmentalization" of the probable cause inquiry and 
rejected such an approach. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6. Gates held 
that basis of knowledge, veracity, and reliability instead "should be understood simply as 
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question 
whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a 
particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230,103 S.Ct. at 2328. In other words, the reviewing 
court should not consider these factors separately, but should consider them as a whole. The 
Saddler majority's compartmentalization of those factors violated that principle. 
17 
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2. The Majority Opinion Improperly Focuses on the Category of 
Informants Rather Than on the Unique Characteristics of a 
Particular Informant 
In its effort to determine whether the veracity and reliability "portions" of the test 
were satisfied, the majority creates a "superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules . . . 
[that] "cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are—quite properly, issued on 
the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less 
demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings." Id. at 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at 
2331. 
For example, in analyzing the CI's credibility, the majority imposes another rigid test, 
lifted from Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231,235-36 (Utah App. 1997), requiring the 
court to determine whether the CI "qualified" as a citizen informant or police informant. See 
Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ff 11-14. However, in focusing on what category the CI may 
fit into, the majority regresses into an "excessively technical dissection" of the affidavit that 
is not useful. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234,103 S.Ct. at 2330. By doing so, the majority gives 
"undue attention [to] isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts 
presented to the magistrate." Id. at 234-35,103 S.Ct. at 2330. 
The majority implicitly creates a set of rules that an informant must meet to qualify as 
a citizen-informant The majority opinion suggests that a citizen-informant must be an 
"average" citizen who volunteers the information to police. See id. at f 13-14 (citing State v. 
White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1993)). The majority suggests that someone who 
has participated in criminal activity may not qualify as a citizen-informant—even if he or she 
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has not been promised or paid anything in return. Id. The majority implies that to qualify 
for such favored status, the criminal informant must have indicated "a remorse for his past 
participation or a determination to avoid future involvement." Id. at f 14. 
The majority's analysis misses the mark. The reliability of an informant turns not on 
whether the CI qualifies as a citizen-informant or is relegated to the level of a police-
informant, but rather whether the circumstances as a whole suggest that the informant was 
credible. As noted in Gates, "[informants' tips doubtless come . . . from many different 
types of persons" and "like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene[, 
they] may vary greatly in their value and reliability.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 
2329. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 (1972)). As 
such, "'[r]igid legal rules,'" such as those created by the majority here, '"are ill-suited to an 
area of such diversity.'" Id. (quoting Adams, 407 U.S. at 147,92 S.Ct. at 1924). 
The majority's attempt here to pigeonhole the CI into one category or the other 
demonstrates the futility of such an exercise. See Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 14 (holding 
that "we do not know whether CI was a citizen- or police-informant"). It also demonstrates 
how rules that may appear sensible under one set of facts prove ill-considered in other 
circumstances. For example, the majority acknowledges, albeit reluctantly, that the CI 
'"provided the information out of a . . . desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled 
substances into the community,' and that [the] CI was4 [neither] promised nor paid for any of 
the information provided.'" Saddler,2003 UT App 82, at f 14 (second bracket in original). 
However, the majority concludes that those facts carry no weight here because they bolster 
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the reliability of only citizen-informants. Id. (citing State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515,517 (Utah 
App. 1992)). The majority has it backwards. Citizen-informants are credible because they 
"volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit." 
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,286 (Utah App. 1990). If that is the motive of an informant 
who has in the past smoked marijuana, then like the majority's "citizen informant," his or her 
credibility is enhanced. 
3. The Majority Opinion Insists on More Detail Than Is Required 
Under Gates 
The majority opinion also imposes a burden of detail far greater than is required under 
the Fourth Amendment. A search warrant affidavit must contain more than an officer's 
conclusory statement that he or she has received reliable information from a credible person 
that evidence will be found in a particular place. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,103 S.Ct. at 2332-
33 (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S 108,84 S.Ct. 1509)). "Sufficient information must be presented 
to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Id. This does not mean, however, "'that 
each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or 
that each and every fact which contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the 
complaint."' Id. at 231 n.6,103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 224-25, 84 
S.Ct. at 1371). All that is required is that '"enough information be presented to the 
[magistrate] to enable him to make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are 
sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal process'" 
Id. (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 224-25, 84 S.Ct. at 1371) (emphasis in original). 
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(a) Detailing the CFs Relationship with Defendant and Detective 
As reflected in the affidavit, the CI told Detective McCarthy that (1) she has known 
defendant for over one year, (2) she has been to his home "numerous times," (3) she has 
observed him use cocaine and marijuana on numerous occasions in the past year, and (4) she 
herself used marijuana with him on several of those occasions. R. 72. She also advised 
Detective McCarthy that that defendant "sells controlled substances to be able to afford his 
own usage and as a separate source of income." R. 73. Nevertheless, the majority complains 
that "[w]e do not know the type of relationship [the] CI had with [defendant], for what 
purpose the CI visited defendant, "how" the CI knew defendant, "or when and how often 
[the] CI visited [defendant's] residence." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at fflf 19, 21. 
The Fourth Amendment does not require the detail required by the majority here. As 
held in Gates, the Fourth Amendment "require[s] only that some facts bearing on [the 
reliability or veracity of an informant] be provided to the magistrate." Gates, 462 U.S. at 
231 n.6,103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6. It is enough to show that the CI was "'relying on something 
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based 
merely on an individual's general reputation.'" Id. at 2327 n.3,103 S.Ct. at 229 n.3 (quoting 
Aguilar, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589). 
The majority also complains that "we do not know whether CI and McCarthy met 
face-to-face or communicated by telephone or letter," whether McCarthy "ever... had the 
opportunity to evaluate CPs truthfulness," whether McCarthy knew the CI's identity and 
thus "subjected himself to the penalty of providing false information," and whether CI had 
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ever provided McCarthy information before and whether this information proved reliable." 
Id. at f 16. While each of the alleged unknowns might have enhanced the reliability of the 
informant, they are not required for a finding of probable cause. 
In the first place, Gates does not require that the credibility of the informant be 
established beyond doubt. As noted in Gates, "anonymous tips seldom could survive [such] 
a rigorous application," and yet, they "frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 
'perfect crimes.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. "While a conscientious 
assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a 
standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants"—like the one 
imposed by the majority here—"is not." Id. 
In the second place, the majority's treatment of the CI as an anonymous informant is 
error. In his affidavit, Detective McCarthy did not expressly state that he knew the 
informant's identity. However, he did "ask" that the magistrate "not [ ] require [him] to 
publish the CI's name" because McCarthy "believe[d] that the CI may be harmed if [her] 
name were published." R. 72. Thus, the only reasonable inference is that Detective 
McCarthy knew the CI's identity, because he requested that he not be required to divulge her 
name. Id. No such request would be necessary if he did not know it. As noted by the 
dissent, "[o]ne cannot publish a name one does not know." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 
34 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
Despite this reasonable inference, the majority makes a contrary inference, treating 
the CI as an anonymous informant. The majority reasons that "[i]t is not reasonable to infer, 
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without more information, that CI, who was too afraid to allow his name to be published in 
the affidavit, was not also too afraid to give his name to the police officer drafting the 
affidavit." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 16 & n.3. This inference, however, is 
unreasonable in light of the detective's request that he not be required to publish the name. 
Even if it could be said that the affidavit was ambiguous in this regard, this Court has 
made clear, as the dissent points out, that the reviewing court "must defer to the magistrate 
where, given the affidavit's language, the magistrate could reasonably construe a meaning 
that favors a probable cause determination." Id. at f 34 (Billings, J., dissenting) (citing State 
v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,992 (Utah 1989)). By drawing a contrary inference, the majority's 
decision is in conflict with the Supreme Court's mandate in Gates that courts pay "great 
deference" to the magistrate's probable cause determination. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 
103S.Ct.at2331. 
(b) Detailing Defendant's Criminal Activity 
The majority laments that we do not know how much contraband the CI saw, "when 
[s]he saw it," where [s]he saw it, "how often or how recently" she observed it, or "how much 
detail [the] CI gave" regarding these facts. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at fflf 19,21. A review 
of the affidavit reveals otherwise. The affidavit stated that the CI told police that she "has 
been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, 
and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." R. 72. Thus, contrary to the conclusion 
of the court of appeals, the magistrate was in fact informed as to when the CI saw the 
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marijuana (within 7-10 days), where she saw it (defendant's home), and how much she saw 
(3-4 lbs). 
Because the allegation in the affidavit was not as clear as it otherwise might have 
been, the majority holds that it "cannot reasonably infer that it was during this visit that CI 
saw the marijuana." Saddler, 2003 UT 82, at J 19 n.4. Again, the majority draws an 
inference against probable cause where it could "reasonably construe a meaning that favors a 
probable cause determination." Id. at f 34 (Billings, J., dissenting) (citing Babbell, 770 P.2d 
at 992). By drawing a contrary inference, the majority exhibits a "grudging or negative 
attitude" towards the search warrant which "is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236,103 
S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotes and citations omitted). As once noted by the Supreme Court, 
"[a] policeman's affidavit 'should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest,' but, rather, 
must be judged by the facts it contains." Harris, 403 U.S. at 579,91 S.Ct. at 2080 (citations 
omitted). 
The affidavit also indicated that the CI told Detective McCarthy that she has observed 
in defendant's home (1) three scales "used to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale;" 
(2) cocaine and packaging material; and (3) the sale of controlled substances by defendant. 
Although she did not specify exactly when she made these observations or provide intricate 
details of the circumstances surrounding her observations, the information she provided was 
sufficient in light of her other statements. For example, she indicated that defendant had 
admitted to her that he usells marijuana and cocaine." R. 72 (emphasis added). She also 
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stated that "the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been long term." R. 72 (emphasis 
added). This information was more than sufficient to establish that defendant's drug sales 
were ongoing and that evidence of those drug sales would be found in defendant's home.2 
The majority improperly describes these facts as a "conclusory outline," rather than "a 
detailed description of [the] CI's statement." Id. at f 21. The majority thus requires that the 
affidavit detail the circumstances surrounding every observation of an informant. As noted 
by the dissent, "[t]he Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirements are not that 
burdensome." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 36 (Billings, J., dissenting). The majority's 
rigid and hypertechnical requirements of detail are far beyond what is required under Gates. 
All that is required is that the affidavit include "some of the underlying circumstances from 
which the officer concluded that that the informant was "credible" or his information 
"reliable." Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S at 
114,103 S.Ct. at 1514) (emphasis added in Gates). The Fourth Amendment does not require 
an "elaborate exegeses of the informant's tip." Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gates 
upheld a search warrant which disclosed none of the circumstances surrounding the 
anonymous informant's observations. 
2
 Even though the CI specifically stated that "the illicit sales operation is ongoing and 
has been long term," R. 73, the majority refuses to accept the fact that defendant's criminal 
activity was ongoing. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 21 & n.5. As noted, the majority's 
refusal to countenance the CI's statement violates its duty to defer to the magistrate's 
probable cause determination. See Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992. 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(c) Detailing Detective McCarthy's Surveillance 
The majority also complains about the lack of detail Detective McCarthy provided 
regarding his surveillance of defendant's home. The affidavit advised the magistrate that 
Detective McCarthy performed surveillance of defendant's home between 8:00 p.m. on June 
14,2000 and 6:00 a.m. on June 15,2000. R. 73. It revealed that Detective McCarthy did not 
observe anyone at the residence initially, but that after midnight he "observed some short 
term traffic" at the residence that he believed was drug-related. R. 73-74. The affidavit 
further stated that at Detective McCarthy's direction, a patrol officer performed a traffic stop 
of one of the short-term visitors to defendant's home and arrested him on outstanding 
warrants. R. 73. In a search incident to arrest, police discovered approximately one-half 
ounce of marijuana on the driver's person and a plastic twist of cocaine residue in the car. R. 
73. However, no paraphernalia used to ingest marijuana or cocaine was found in either the 
car or on the driver's person, which suggested to the officer that it had been purchased at 
defendant's home. R. 73-74. 
The majority criticizes Detective McCarthy for not stating "how many vehicles he 
saw visit [defendant's] home, whether any of these vehicles arrived during [defendant's] 
alleged hours of operation, whether any of these vehicles or their drivers were described by 
CI, whether the stopped person was a person described by CI or was driving a vehicle 
described by CI, "how long" the stopped person was at the residence, "whether any of the 
vehicles [described by the CI] were part of the short-term traffic," and what time the short 
term traffic was actually observed. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ff 24-25 & n.7. Again, the 
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majority holds that the information provided is only "conclusory" and is thus not "helpful." 
A/.at1H[23-24. 
Once again, the majority has imposed a burden far greater than required under Gates. 
Gates held that the Fourth Amendment does not require " 'that each factual allegation which 
the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or that each and every fact which 
contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint.1" Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6, 
103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224, 85 S.Ct. 1365, 
1371 (1965)). The amendment '"simply requires that enough information be presented to 
the [magistrate] to enable him to make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and 
are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal 
process.'" Id (quoting Jaben, 381 U.S. at 224-25, 85 S.Ct. at 1371) (emphasis added). As 
noted by the dissent here, the description of Detective McCarthy's investigation was more 
than sufficient to corroborate the CI's tip and the majority's refusal to countenance it "is 
contrary to the deference we should afford to the magistrate in determining whether a search 
warrant is valid." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ^  43 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
(d) Detailing Other Facts 
Finally, Detective McCarthy states in his affidavit that the CI told him of defendant's 
"hours of operation," that defendant was home "infrequently and usually during the late 
evening hours," that his "only legitimate source of income is from a part time waiter's job at 
a Salt Lake City restaurant," and that he purchased the home within the last couple of 
months. R. 73. Again, the majority criticizes this information for a lack of detail, 
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complaining that Detective McCarthy failed to relate the CI's description of the cars and 
house and their actual description. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 19,21,26. While more 
detail may have been useful, it was not critical here. The fact that no one knew when 
defendant was scheduled to work reasonably suggests that he did not in fact maintain full 
time employment but worked part time. Moreover, the magistrate could reasonably conclude 
that the CI accurately identified the owner of the vehicle used by defendant where Detective 
McCarthy indicated that "the registered owner was as described by CI." R. 73; see Babbell, 
770 P.2d at 992 (holding that magistrate may construe "matched the description" to mean 
that truck matched description given by CI). 
4. The Majority Opinion Improperly Refuses to Recognize the CPs 
Statement Against Penal Interest 
The majority also errs in concluding that the "CI made no statement against penal 
interest" because "there is no other evidence against him." Id. at fflf 17-18. As noted by the 
dissent below, Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ^ f 35, the majority's holding that other evidence 
is required conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
"[ajdmissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia 
of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search." Harris, 
403 U.S. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. Nothing in the opinion suggests that other evidence 
against an informant who incriminates himself must exist before his statement can be 
considered a statement against penal interest. See id. at 583-85, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. 
* * * 
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In summary, the majority opinion is in direct conflict with Gates. As noted by the 
dissent, it "undermines what should be our preference for searches conducted pursuant to 
search warrants." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ^  44. Moreover, it disregards the deference 
that should be afforded to the magistrate's probable cause determination. Under a proper 
analysis under Gates, the affidavit here was more than sufficient to establish probable cause 
to believe that contraband would be found in defendant's residence as asserted by the 
informant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted December 29, 2003. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
Kl Anthony A. Saddler (Saddler) appeals his conviction for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000). Saddler challenges the trial court's 
order denying his motion to suppress evidence and upholding the 
constitutionality of the search warrant. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On June 15, 2000, Detective Bill McCarthy (McCarthy) 
obtained a warrant to search Saddler's residence for marijuana, 
cocaine, and related items. In issuing the search warrant, the 
magistrate relied on an affidavit provided by McCarthy, who 
prepared the affidavit using information from a confidential 
informant (CI). The affidavit established McCarthy's nineteen 
years of general police experience and his specific experience 
and training in narcotics investigation. It also stated "CI has 
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided," 
and claimed "CI . . . provided the information out of a sense of 
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guilt and desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled 
substances into the community." Further, it requested "the 
courts not . . . require [McCarthy] to publish the CI' s name," 
for McCarthy "believe[d] . . . the CI [could] be harmed if CI's 
name were published." 
13 According to the affidavit, CI told McCarthy the following: 
CI has known the suspect, Saddler for 
over one year; 
CI has observed the suspect use cocaine 
and marijuana on numerous occasions during 
the last year; 
CI has used marijuana with the suspect 
on several occasions; 
CI has been to the premises numerous 
times, the most recent being within the last 
week to ten days, and observed approximately 
three to four pounds of marijuana; 
CI has observed three scales inside the 
home, that the suspect uses to weigh out 
repackaged marijuana for resale; 
CI has observed cocaine inside the 
premises, along with packaging material; 
CI has observed the suspect carry 
marijuana and cocaine on his person; 
The suspect has told CI that the suspect 
sells marijuana and cocaine; 
CI has observed the suspect sell and use 
controlled substances, inside the named 
premises; 
CI has been told by the suspect that the 
suspect recently purchased the listed 
premises; 
CI states that the suspect's only 
legitimate source of income is from a part-
time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City 
restaurant, BACI's; 
CI states that the suspect sells 
controlled substances to be able to afford 
his own usage and as a separate source of 
income; 
CI provided a description of the home, a 
vehicle frequently used by the suspect 
(female companion of suspect), and hours of 
operation for the suspect; 
CI states that the suspect is home 
infrequently and usually during the late 
evening hours. 
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114 The affidavit also describes McCarthy's corroboration 
efforts. On June 14 and 15, 2000, McCarthy conducted 
surveillance of Saddler's home between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 
and did not observe anyone. At an unspecified time on June 15, 
McCarthy observed some "short term traffic," which he believed 
was "drug related." West Valley Police stopped one of the 
vehicles leaving the premises and found the driver in possession 
of one-half ounce of marijuana. Police found no drug 
paraphernalia in the vehicle or on the driver's person, which 
indicated to McCarthy "the marijuana was purchased from 
[Saddler's] premises." 
f5 McCarthy also "observed vehicles described by CI at 
[Saddler's] premises and the registered owner was a [sic] 
described by CI." Finally, McCarthy checked BACI's restaurant on 
June 15, and Saddler "was not at work and it was unknown when he 
was scheduled to return." 
116 After obtaining and executing the search warrant, on June 
15, police seized approximately ten ounces of marijuana and one 
gram of cocaine, along with drug packaging material, triple beam 
scales, and $478,00 in cash. Saddler subsequently filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence. After the trial court denied the 
motion, Saddler pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, conditional upon 
his right to appeal the suppression issue. See State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
17 The sole issue is whether the trial court erred by denying 
Saddler's motion to suppress evidence and concluding McCarthy's 
affidavit established probable cause to search Saddler's 
residence. "[T]his court, like the reviewing court below, is 
bound by the contents of the affidavit, we therefore need not 
defer to the trial court's finding". . . . " State v. Deluna, 
2001 UT App 401,19, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citation 
omitted), cert, denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. Instead, '"we make 
an independent review of the trial court's determination of the 
sufficiency of the written evidence.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). "However, 'the 
[F]ourth [Almendment does not require that the reviewing court 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause 
determination[.] [I]nstead, it requires only that the reviewing 
court conclude "that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
. . . [determining] that probable cause existed."'" Id. 
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 
987, 991 (Utah 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 
238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983))). We therefore "pay great 
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deference to the magistrate's determination." State v viah 871 
P. 2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).l 
ANALYSIS 
f8 Saddler argues McCarthy's affidavit supporting the search 
warrant did not establish probable cause for the search. We 
agree. 
19 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees that "no [wjarrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause." U.S. Const, amend. IV. "[W]hen a search warrant is 
issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit must contain 
specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutral 
magistrate that probable cause exists." State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989). "It is well settled that Utah courts 
employ the.ftotality-of-the-circumstances test1 articulated in 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 
L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit 
supporting a search warrant." State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus, " [p]robable cause is determined by a 
magistrate who fmake[s] a practical common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.1" Id. 
(second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332). 
flO "Where, as here, information obtained from [an] informant[] 
is the primary support for the search warrant, an analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances requires us to consider the three 
factors articulated by this court in Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 
943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)." State v. Deluna, 
2001 UT App 401,111, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 
150; ssa state v. Valsnzuela, 2001 UT A P P 332,11i6-i7, 37 P.3d 
1. The dissent is concerned that we do not give sufficient 
deference to the magistrate's determination. "We pay great 
deference to the magistrate's determination," State v. Viah, 871 
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), because "• [a] grudging or 
negative attitude toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to 
a warrant.1" State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,110, 40 P.3d 1136, 
cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150 (citation omitted). However, 
our preference for warrants does not extend to warrants that are 
not based on probable cause. We will not give deference to the 
magistrate if there is no "substantial basis for . . . 
[determining] that probable cause existed." Id. at 19. 
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260 (extending application of Mulcahv factors to probable cause 
determinations). We now consider those three factors. 
I. Type of Informant/Basis of Knowledge 
111 The first factor is "the type of tip or informant involved." 
Kavsville Citv v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). "After all, • [n]ot all tips are of equal value in 
establishing [probable cause].'" Id. (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). "Factors to consider in determining whether 
probable cause exists include an informant's veracity, 
reliability and basis of knowledge." State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 
515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 233, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983)) (other citations 
omitted); see also State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) ("Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge of confidential informants are no longer strict 
prerequisites for establishing probable cause, they are still 
relevant considerations, among others, in determining the 
existence of probable cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances." 
(quotations and citations omitted)). 
112 In this case, the basis of knowledge portion is satisfied.2 
Basis of knowledge is satisfied where the informant speaks from 
personal observation. See Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Here, the 
affidavit sets forth information based on CIfs personal 
observations. For instance, the affidavit notes that CI 
"observed [Saddler] use cocaine and marijuana," "observed approx. 
3 to 4 pounds of marijuana," and "observed cocaine inside 
[Saddler's] premises." 
1fl3 However, the veracity and reliability portions are not 
satisfied. Generally, "an ordinary citizen-informant needs no 
independent proof of reliability or veracity." State v. Deluna, 
2001 UT App 401,1l4, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS 
150 (quotations and citations omitted). A citizen-informant is 
"an average citizen who is in a position to supply information by 
virtue of having been a crime victim or witness." State v. 
2. The dissent argues that we dismiss the basis of knowledge 
portion too quickly in our analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances. This is not true. We acknowledge that the basis 
of knowledge portion of the test is satisfied. However, the 
basis of knowledge portion alone does not establish probable 
cause in the absence of information concerning CI's veracity and 
reliability. While basis of knowledge tells us how CI acquired 
his information, it does not tell us whether he was qualified to 
assess the information, whether he relayed the information 
accurately, or whether he is trustworthy. 
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Whits, 851 P;2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations and 
citations omitted). Such an informant "thereafter relates to the 
police what he knows as a matter of civic duty." State v. Evans, 
692 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and 
citations omitted) (cited for this proposition by Mulcahy, 943 
P.2dat 235 n.2). Alternatively, a police-informant (or 
criminal-informant) is "one who gains information through 
involvement in criminal activity or who is f"motivated . . . by 
pecuniary gain,"•" and thus is "lower on the reliability scale." 
MyilcflilY/ 943 P.2d at 235 n.2 (quoting Evans. 692 So. 2d at 219) . 
1(14^  In this case, we do not know whether CI was a citizen- or a 
police-informant. However, we do know that CI "used marijuana 
with [Saddler] on several occasions." Thus, we know CI was part 
of the criminal environment, lowering his veracity and 
reliability. We also know that CI "provided the information out 
of a . . . desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled 
substances into the community," and that CI was " [neither] 
promised nor paid for any of the information provided." Although 
this information bolsters reliability and veracity in citizen-
informants, £££ Purser. 828 P.2d at 517 (assuming reliability and 
veracity for citizen-informant who volunteered the information 
and "receive[d] nothing from police in exchange for the 
information"), we do not know whether CI qualified as a citizen-
informant or volunteered the information to police- Further, we 
fail to see how the conclusory statement that CI is providing the 
information out of a sense of guilt and a desire to stop the sale 
of controlled substances significantly bolsters his veracity and 
reliability when he is a participant in the criminal environment 
and has not indicated a remorse for his past participation or a 
determination to avoid future involvement. See People v. 
Kershaw. 195 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting 
that informants who are "criminals, drug addicts or professional 
'stool pigeons1" may be motivated to volunteer information not 
only for promises or payments, but also for "revenge or the hope 
of eliminating criminal competition"), superceded bv statute on 
other q¥9Un<3g/ People v. Burch. 232 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) . 
H15 Also important to veracity and reliability is whether the 
informant is anonymous. tfl[B]ecause an anonymous caller's basis 
of knowledge and veracity are typically unknown,' anonymous tips 
are toward 'the low-end of the reliability scale.1" Mulcahy, 943 
P.2d at 235 (citation omitted). Informants who "g[i]ve their 
full names," thus "subject[ing] themselves to a penalty for 
providing false information," Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at fl5, are 
more reliable than informants who "hid[e] behind the cloak of 
telephonic [or other] anonymity" so that their identities cannot 
be traced. State v. McCloskev. 453 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Minn. 
1990) . 
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f16 Here, we do not know whether CI and McCarthy met face-to-
face or communicated by telephone or letter. Consequently, we do 
not know whether McCarthy ever, using his police training and 
experience, had the opportunity to evaluate CI's truthfulness. 
We also do not know whether CI told McCarthy his name.3 
Consequently, we do not know whether CI subjected himself to the 
penalty of providing false information. Similarly, we do not 
know whether CI had ever provided McCarthy information before and 
whether this information proved reliable. See State v. Bailey. 
675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (noting that information in the 
affidavit showing "the informant had previously given truthful 
information to the police concerning the existence of contraband" 
is "an accepted method for establishing an informant's 
veracity"). 
fl7 Next, an informant's reliability and veracity are improved 
where he provides information against his penal interest. See 
United States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082 
(1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal 
interest" "carr[ied] their own indicia of credibility")/ In re 
Shon Daniel K. . 959 P.2d 553, 558 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (noting 
statements against penal interest are one indication of informant 
reliability) . 
1fl8 Here, CI made no statement against penal interest. Although 
he did admit to using marijuana with Saddler on several 
occasions, this admission means nothing if CI did not reveal his 
identity, thus subjecting himself to the danger of prosecution. 
Furthermore, even if we knew CI's identity, his statement would 
still not be an admission against penal interest because there is 
no other evidence against him. See State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 
1232, 1241 n.24 (Utah 1993) (noting the "corpus delicti rule 
states that a person may not be convicted of a crime if no 
independent evidence, outside of the defendant's own statement, 
exists"). 
1l9 Finally, an informant's veracity arid reliability may be 
"'boosted by the detail with which the informant described his 
personal observation1 of the [crime]." Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206. 
3. The State argues that we should defer to the trial court's 
inference that CI was not anonymous. See State v. Babbell, 770 
P. 2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an 
affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable 
construction" of that ambiguity). We disagree. It is not 
reasonable to infer, without more information, that CI, who was 
too afraid to allow his name to be published in the affidavit, 
was not also too afraid to give his name to the police officer 
drafting the affidavit. 
20020119-CA 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Here, the affidavit provides little more than an outline of what 
CI told McCarthy. We do not know the type of relationship CI had 
with Saddler or how often and for what purpose CI visited 
Saddler. Also, although CI says he saw marijuana, cocaine, 
packaging materials, and scales in the home, we do not know how 
much marijuana and cocaine he saw, when he saw it, or where it 
was located.4 Finally, aside from the conclusory statement that 
CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used 
by Saddler, and Saddler's hours of operation, we do not know 
anything about CI's actual description of these facts. 
II. Information Detail 
f20 "The second Mulcahy factor we must consider is whether 'the 
informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity 
to support a [warrant].'" State v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401,fl9, 
40 P.3d 1136 (alteration in original) (citation omitted), cert, 
denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. "It is well established that a 
warrant cannot issue solely on the strength of 'a mere conclusory 
statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for 
making a judgment regarding probable cause.'" State v. Babbell, 
770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). Moreover, 
judges should be reluctant to base a probable cause determination 
on poorly drafted affidavits. See id. at 992 n.3 (noting the 
finding of probable cause was "a very close question" where the 
affidavit included the witnesses1 description of a truck but not 
the officer's description of the truck he said matched the 
witnesses1 description). "The better approach would be to 
require that an affiant take the simple but critical additional 
step of clearly and unambiguously stating" the detail provided by 
the informant. Id. "A few short minutes spent in more carefully 
preparing [an] affidavit would have ensured the protection of the 
accused's constitutional rights while saving a substantial amount 
of time for the courts and parties." Id. 
1121 Here, we do not know how much detail CI gave. Rather than 
provide a detailed description of CI' s statement in the 
affidavit, McCarthy provided a conclusory outline of CIfs 
statement. We do not know how CI knew Saddler or when and how 
often CI visited Saddler's residence. Nor do we know how often 
or how recently CI observed controlled substances in Saddler's 
4. We know that at some point, CI observed what he described as 
three to four pounds of marijuana at Saddler's premises. 
However, we do not know when CI made this observation. Although 
the affidavit says CI had been to the house within the last seven 
to ten days, we cannot reasonably infer that it was during this 
visit that CI saw the marijuana. 
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residence.5 We also do not know what detail CI gave about 
Saddler's residence, routine, hours of operation, vehicles, 
clients, or clients' vehicles.6 
III. Confirmation by Police Officer 
f22 "The final Mulcahy factor is whether the police officer 
independently confirms the informants' information." State v. 
Deluna. 2001 UT App 401,120, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied. 2002 
Utah LEXIS 150. Corroboration "means, in light of the 
circumstances, [the officer] confirms enough facts so that he may 
reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable." 
Kavsville Citv v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) . A police officer "'may corroborate the tip either by 
observing the illegal activity or by finding [the material facts] 
substantially as described by the informant.'" Id. {citations 
omitted). 
f23 Here, McCarthy's corroboration was not helpful. First, 
McCarthy conducted surveillance of Saddler's premises during the" 
hours CI said Saddler was home. Between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., 
McCarthy saw nothing to corroborate CI's information. 
5. The State argues that probable cause exists even though the 
affidavit fails to provide specific dates and time periods 
because it establishes a course of conduct. We disagree. 
"'[W]here the affidavit properly recites facts indicating 
activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of 
conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.'" State 
v, Stromberq. 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation 
omitted). Although CI uses the present tense to say Saddler 
"sells controlled substances," see State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258, 1261 (Utah 1983) (holding information in search warrant not 
stale because the language used was "couched . . . in the present 
tense which describes ongoing criminal conduct"), CI only talks 
about Saddler using and selling controlled substances from his 
home in the past tense and does not provide sufficient detail for 
us to ascertain whether the activity was of a protracted and 
continuous nature. 
6. We do know CI said Saddler was home infrequently and usually 
during the late evening hours. Although seemingly helpful, this 
detail was discounted by McCarthy's own attempt at corroboration. 
When McCarthy conducted surveillance of Saddler's home during the 
late evening hours (8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.), he did not gather 
any corroborating information. 
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124 Second, at some point the next day, McCarthy says he saw 
short-term traffic that he believed to be drug related.7 One car 
was stopped and one-half ounce of marijuana was found on the 
driver, which McCarthy believed was purchased at Saddler's home 
because no drug paraphernalia was found. However, McCarthy 
provides only conclusory information about this corroborative 
effort. See State v. Babbeiy 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) ("It 
is well established that a warrant cannot issue solely on the 
strength of 'a mere conclusory statement that gives the 
magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment 
regarding probable cause. •,f (citation omitted)). He does not 
state how many vehicles he saw visit Saddler's home, whether any 
of these vehicles arrived during Saddler's alleged hours of 
operation, whether any of these vehicles or their drivers were 
described by CI, whether the stopped person was a person 
described by CI or was driving a vehicle described by CI, or how 
long the stopped person was at Saddler's home. 
f25 Third, McCarthy observed vehicles described by CI at 
Saddler's premises whose registered owner was described by CI. 
Again, McCarthy provides no detail as to what type of vehicles 
were present, how many vehicles he observed, whether they were 
part of the short-term traffic, or whether they were present 
during Saddler's alleged hours of operation. See id. 
f26 Finally, McCarthy visited BACI•s, Saddler's place of 
employment, where he learned Saddler was not at work and the 
person he spoke to did not know when Saddler was scheduled to 
work next. With more detail, this information may have provided 
important corroborative detail. However, as is, the information 
is practically useless. Although McCarthy established that 
Saddler worked at BACI's, we do not know who McCarthy spoke to or 
whether that person was in a position to know Saddler's schedule. 
We also do not know whether the person McCarthy spoke to thought 
it was unusual that Saddler was not currently at work or whether 
the person thought Saddler's work schedule in general was 
unusual. 
CONCLUSION 
127 Under the totality of the circumstances, we are convinced 
that the search warrant affidavit in this case failed to 
establish probable cause for the search of Saddler's home. 
Although the affidavit sufficiently established CI's basis of 
7, Although the dissent concludes McCarthy saw the short-term 
traffic during the early morning hours, no actual time is 
provided by the affidavit. 
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knowledge, it failed to establish CI's veracity and reliability. 
Moreover, the detail and corroboration included in the affidavit 
were not enough to establish probable cause in the absence of a 
showing of veracity and reliability. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
suppress the seized evidence. "Since an error amounting to a 
violation of the federal constitution requires reversal unless it 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse [Saddler's] 
conviction [] . " State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) . 
128 Saddler's conviction is reversed and the case is remanded 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
f29 I CONCUR: 
/ . 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
f30 I respectfully dissent. I would conclude that under the 
"totality-of-the-circumstances test" required by Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983), the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . [determining] that 
probable cause existed." State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,f9, 40 
P.3d 1136 (quotations and citations omitted). 
131 As a threshold matter, I disagree with the majority's 
application of the facts to controlling law. First, I conclude 
the affidavit establishes CI's reliability. As the majority 
acknowledges, CI's basis of knowledge was strong. The affidavit 
set forth facts personally observed by CI over a one-year period: 
CI observed Saddler using marijuana and cocaine; CI used 
marijuana with Saddler; CI within the last ten days observed 
three to four pounds of marijuana; CI observed scales in 
Saddler's home that Saddler allegedly used to weigh and package 
marijuana for re-sale; CI stated that Saddler admitted to him 
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that he sells marijuana and cocaine/ and CI observed Saddler 
selling controlled substances inside the named premises. 
132 However, the majority dismisses this strong basis of 
knowledge and claims the veracity and reliability prongs are not 
satisfied. I disagree. Veracity and reliability can be 
buttressed by a high degree of detail presented by CI in the 
affidavit and independent corroboration of such detail by the 
police. S&£ State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). Both are present here. 
133 CI admittedly used drugs with Saddler in the past. However, 
CI was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the information 
provided." This bolsters CI's reliability and veracity. See 
State v. Viah, 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Because 
the confidential informant here received nothing in exchange for 
information about [the] illegal activities, the magistrate 
properly assumed that the informant was reliable.")/ State v. 
Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (assuming 
reliability and veracity for citizen informant who "receive[d] 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information" 
(citations omitted))• 
134 I further disagree with the majority's claim that we do not 
know if CI volunteered the information to Officer McCarthy. On 
the contrary, a fair reading of the affidavit establishes that he 
did. The affidavit plainly states that CI told Officer McCarthy 
the information out of "a sense of guilt and a desire to stop the 
sales and usage of controlled substances in the community." 
Further, the majority refuses to acknowledge CI told Officer 
McCarthy CI's name and was therefore not anonymous. Where an 
affidavit is ambiguous, we must defer to the magistrate where, 
given the affidavit's language, the magistrate could reasonably 
construe a meaning that favors a probable cause determination. 
S££ State v, BabbgU, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) 
(acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, but deferring to 
magistrate's "reasonable construction" of that ambiguity). 
Although Officer McCarthy did not directly state that he knew 
CI's name, a magistrate could reasonably construe Officer 
McCarthy's knowledge of CI's name from the affidavit's language. 
The affidavit clearly asks that the court not require Officer 
McCarthy to "publish the CI's name." One cannot publish a name 
one does not know. 
135 The majority is hyper-technical in claiming CI's admission 
that he used drugs with Saddler was not against his penal 
interest and thus did not bolster his reliability. Ssa Hatted 
States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971) 
(holding statements "against the informant's penal interest" 
"carr[ied] their own indicia of credibility"). As previously 
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stated, in my view, the affidavit establishes that CI did reveal 
his identity to the officer. I also disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that, because there is no other evidence against CI, 
there was no admission against penal interest. We simply do not 
know if there is other evidence against CI, nor should we expect 
such evidence in the affidavit. CI made incriminating statements 
with both the possibility that such statements could be 
investigated and the possibility that other evidence could be 
found. "People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical 
evidence in the hands of police in the form of their own 
admissions." Id. at ,583, 91 S. Ct. at 2082. In Harris, the 
Supreme Court similarly found, without more, that an informant's 
disclosure that he purchased illegal whiskey from the defendant 
over a period of two years was a statement against penal interest 
that "carrfied] [its] own indicia of credibility."8 403 U.S. at 
575, 583, 91 S. Ct. at 2078, 2082. 
f36 As the majority acknowledges, an informant's veracity and 
reliability may be "boosted by the detail with which the 
informant described his personal observation of the [crime]." 
State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (quotations and 
citation omitted). However, the majority finds the description 
of the ongoing use and sale of drugs over a period of a year, 
including the observation of scales, packaging material, and 
three to four pounds of marijuana within the previous ten days,* 
to be insufficient detail. The majority requires the affidavit 
recite, for example, more detail about Saddler's residence, such 
as, presumably, where in the house CI saw the materials. The 
8. According to the Harris court, " [t]hat the informant may be 
paid or promised a 'break1 does not eliminate the residual risk 
and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct." United 
States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082 
(1971) . Here, CI was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the 
information provided." 
9. The majority claims they could not reasonably infer CI saw 
marijuana within the last ten days. I disagree. 
The affidavit provides, "CI has been to the premises numerous 
times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, 
and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." Although this 
language arguably does not link the observation of marijuana with 
CI's most recent visit to Saddler's premises, we "pay great 
deference to the magistrate's determination," State v. Vicrh, 871 
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and a magistrate could 
reasonably infer such a link. £§£ State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 
987, 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, 
but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable construction" of that 
ambiguity). 
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Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirements are not that 
burdensome. We "pay great deference to the magistrate's 
determination," Viah, 871 P.2d at 1033, because '"[a] grudging 
or negative attitude . . . toward warrants' is inconsistent with 
the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at flO (quoting 
Gates. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331). 
137 The majority further complains CI's statements are 
conclusory. Again I disagree. The sufficient details include CI 
knowing Saddler for over one year and observing cocaine and 
marijuana in the home, including three to four pounds of 
marijuana within the previous ten days; observation of scales and 
packaging material; observation of Saddler selling drugs from the 
home; and numerous observations of Saddler using drugs in the 
home. Where, as here, "'the affidavit properly recites facts 
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a 
course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less 
significant."1 State v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citation omitted). In Strombera, for instance, the 
court noted with approval under similar facts that "[t]he 
informant observed marijuana use and marijuana paraphernalia in 
the home on not one occasion, but on numerous visits to the 
home." Id. 
138 Even if veracity and reliability were weak, this is not 
fatal under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. See State v. 
Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (noting "an informant's 
'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant 
considerations, among others, in determining the existence of 
probable cause," and concluding "[a] weakness in one [area] or 
the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as" the affidavit, 
as a whole, provides a "substantial basis for finding probable 
cause") . In sum, however, under the totality-of-the-
circumstances, I conclude the affidavit established the veracity 
and reliability of CI. 
13 9 The majority also faults Officer McCarthy's corroboration of 
CI's information. A police officer "may corroborate the tip 
either by observing the illegal activity or by finding [the 
material facts] substantially as described by the informant." 
KaygvUlg CitV V. MulcahV, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quotations and citations omitted). The majority finds Officer 
McCarthy's corroboration unhelpful. On the contrary, I conclude 
Officer McCarthy met both prongs of the corroboration 
requirement. 
1140 Officer McCarthy both observed illegal activity and verified 
the facts as described by CI. On June 15, 2000, in early morning 
hours (as described by CI), Officer McCarthy observed short term 
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traffic to and from Saddler's house which, based on his nineteen 
years of experience and training in narcotics investigation, he 
believed indicated the sale of drugs in the home. See Purser, 
828 P.2d at 516, 518 (concluding that where the detective 
"described his narcotics experience" and "observed persons enter 
defendant's residence and leave after only a few minutes, . . . 
suggest[ing] narcotics trafficking," such corroboration was 
helpful in finding probable cause); State v. White, 851 P.2d 
1195, 1196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding that where the 
detective stated in his affidavit "he had seen vehicles arrive at 
the [defendant's residence] and stay for a very short period of 
timet,] . . . consistent with the buying and selling of 
narcotics," such corroboration supported the state's case). 
141 Further, Officer McCarthy had the West Valley Police stop 
one of the vehicles leaving the premises and the driver possessed 
one half ounce of marijuana. Police found no drug paraphernalia 
in the vehicle or on the driver, and based on his training and 
experience, Officer McCarthy concluded this indicated the driver 
had just purchased marijuana in Saddler's house. 
f42 In verifying the facts described by CI, Officer McCarthy 
observed the vehicles described by CI at Saddler's home, verified 
the registered owner of a vehicle was as described by CI, and 
verified that Saddler worked at BACI'S. In my opinion, officer 
McCarthy made significant successful efforts to corroborate CI's 
information. 
f43 In conclusion, I reach a different result than the majority 
based on my application of the facts to the law. This can often 
happen in the fact sensitive area of the Fourth Amendment. 
However, what troubles me about the majority's analysis is that I 
think it is contrary to the deference we should afford to the 
magistrate in determining whether a search warrant is valid. See 
Viah, 871 P.2d at 1033 (noting the "great deference" we pay to 
the magistrate's determination). "[T]he [F]ourth [A]mendment 
does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo 
review of the magistrate's probable cause determination[.] 
[I]nstead, it requires only that the reviewing court conclude 
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . 
[determining] that probable cause existed." Deluna, 2001 UT App 
401 at f9 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). I believe the majority conducts a de novo review and 
gives no deference to the magistrate's determination. 
144 Furthermore, although the majority pays lip service to the 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" standard for the review of search 
warrants, I believe it in reality applies the older and stricter 
Aguilar-Spinelli test. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 
1280, 1286 (Utah 1983) (applying two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli 
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test requiring an affiant demonstrate both basis of knowledge and 
reliability/veracity). This has not been the law in Utah since 
1983, when State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260-61 (Utah 1983), 
first applied the "totality-of-the-circumstances test" required 
by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. See also State v. 
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (noting that 
"veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of confidential 
informants are no longer strict prerequisites for establishing 
probable cause,ff and are instead " 'relevant considerations, among 
others,1'1 under the totality-of-the-circumstances test (citation 
omitted)). The majority's approach undermines what should be our 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to search warrants. 
See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at flO (observing the Fourth 
Amendment has a "'strong preference for searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant'" (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. 
Ct. at 2331)) . 
f45 In sum, I would deny Saddler's motion to suppress and uphold 
the search, which was conducted pursuant to a search warrant, 
because I conclude under the totality-of-the-circumstances that 
the affidavit supporting the issuance of the search warrant 
established probable cause to search Saddler's residence. 
m. TiUL^pj 
fudith M. B i l l i n g s , 
Assoc iate Presiding Judge 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73, 
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South/ a 
single family dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front 
door faces to the east, the numbers 3194 South appear on the front 
of the home mail box in front of the home, to include all 
containers, locked and unlocked, rooms/ attics, basements/ 
outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage. 
( ) liTthe vehicles described as N/A 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or 
evidence described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct/ possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated/ 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Possession of Marijuana and Possession 
of Cocaine With Intent To Distribute. 
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1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
7. MARIJUANA, A'GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
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PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant/Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022 , is employed 
by the West Valley City Police Department, and is currently 
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been 
given the responsibility to investigate narcotic offenses occurring 
in West Valley City and surrounding areas. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification 
and in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has 
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in 
relation to police investigations. Affiant was previously assigned 
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force and the Drug Enforcement Strike 
Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of 
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training 
includes the DEA basic and advanced investigators seminars, as well 
as the California Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug 
recognition, identification and investigative techniques. Your 
affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine 
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb 
Technician. *— 
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and 
distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and 
cocaine. Your affiant received information from a confidential 
informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask the 
courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your 
affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were 
published. Your affiant was told the following by the CI: 
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on 
numerous occasions during the last year, 
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several 
occasions, 
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent 
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 
4 pounds of marijuana, 
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the 
suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale, 
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with 
packaging material, 
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on 
his person, 
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells 
marijuana and cocaine, 
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled 
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PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
substances/ inside the named premises, 
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently 
purchased the listed premises, 
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of 
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City 
restaurant, BACCI's, 
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to 
be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income, 
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle 
frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and 
hours of operation for the suspect, 
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and 
usually during the late evening hours. 
Your affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his 
home address in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial 
surveillance your affiant did not observed anyone at the residence, 
the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 
6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some 
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. 
Your affiant had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic 
stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During 
the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for 
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of 
marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the 
vehicle a small section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and 
appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the 
bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and would 
like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the 
ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was 
told by the transporting officers, of the arrested person, that no 
drug paraphernalia was found on the subject, Oba Tramel. 
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are 
first hand, accurate and truth full, for the following reasons. 
CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used 
marijuana and would recognized the substance when observed. CI has 
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI 
has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to 
stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the 
community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even 
though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises, 
within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales 
operation is ongoing and has been long term. 
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named 
premises and the registered owner was a described by CI. Your 
affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic, 
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PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
short term traffic coming and going to the listed premises. 
Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in 
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of 
cocaine- Further the arrested person was not found with any 
instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which 
your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from 
the listed premises. 
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently 
and works at a restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was 
told that the employment is part time, your affiant checked on 
6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was unknown when he 
was scheduled to return. 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for 
marijuana, cocaine and associated packaging material and 
instruments used to ingest controlled substances. Affiant has been 
told that all these items have been observed inside the listed 
premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should be 
searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and 
carries controlled substances on his person. 
Your affiant prays for any time , announced authority of 
service. Your affiant has been told that the suspect is usually 
only at home during the late evening hours and your affiant's 
observations have confirmed this. 
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy 
Salt Lake County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben 
approved to be presented to the courts for anytime and announced 
authority of service. 
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PAGE FIVE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) in the day time. 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the 
officer's authority or purpose because: 
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given; or 
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed/ 
disposed of/ or secreted. 
N/A 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME t h i s / 5 _ d a y of 1 ^ ^ 2 0 0 0 . 
Time y-*- /£ > r.% °^ 
JUDC 
IN THE ffH*KD DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND "EOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the state of Utah, 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det. 
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73, 
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a single family 
dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front door faces to the east, the 
numbers 3194 South appear on the front of the home mail box in front of the 
home, to include all containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, 
basements, outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage. 
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence 
described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded 
in the day time^ 
at any time of the day or night(good cause having been shown) 
to execute without notice of authority or purpose, 
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or 
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.) 
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1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
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\GZ TWO 
EARCH WARRANT 
o make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
remises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
he same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
istrict Court/ County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property 
n your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
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